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BLOCS, SWARMS, AND OUTLIERS:
CONCEPTUALIZING
DISAGREEMENT ON THE MODERN
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA©
BY PETER MCCORMICK*
Almost half of the Supreme Court of Canada's
decisions are not unanimous, but not all disagreement is
of a kind. It makes a difference whether the panel's
unanimity is broken by a single dissident, by several
judges signing a single set of reasons, or by several
judges each writing separately. This article examines the
notion of disagreement, suggests a conceptual
framework in which the various disagreement formats
can be located, applies that framework to the Court's
performance over the past thirty years, and concludes
with some speculation as to why the Supreme Court of
Canada and the United States Supreme Court should
exhibit such different patterns of behaviour in this
regard.
Pr~s de la moiti6 des decisions de la Cour supreme
du Canada ne sont pas prises i l'unanimit6 et tous les
d6saccords ne se ressemblent pas. Parfois, l'unanimit6
du tribunal est an~antie soit par un seul dissident, soit
par plusieurs juges pour un ensemble de motifs
identiques, ou encore par le jugement individuel de
plusieurs juges. Cet article examine la notion de
d~saccord, suggre un cadre conceptuel permettant de
classifier les diff~rentes formes de ddsaccords et
applique ensuite ce cadre conceptuel aux jugements de
la Cour supr6me ces trente demi~res annes. I1 se
termine par un raisonnement cherchant A savoir
pourquoi la Cour supreme du Canada et Ia Cour
supr6me des Etats-Unis pr~sentent des mod les de
comportement si diffrents i cet 6gard.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The Supreme Court of Canada today decided ..." is how many
news stories begin. Beyond the headlines, however, the real story is often
about a Court whose members have differed on the major issues, with one
or more judges expressing guarded but serious concerns about the
outcome, the majority's supporting reasons, or both. If the Court is in some
ways like an oracle-a comparison all the more attractive for suggesting
both a priestly caste and an opacity of pronouncement-it is an oracle with
a curiously divided voice. When the high priestess proclaims, "Here is
truth!" we can often hear some colleagues mutter, "No, it is not."
Disagreement is only to be expected from a body that deals with
divisive public issues such as abortion, same-sex rights, Aboriginal rights,
collective bargaining, and environmental jurisdiction. Although this
disagreement often comes with softened edges-expressions of "great
respect" for "learned colleagues" whose "excellent reasons" have been read
"to my great advantage"-it is still disagreement, and all the more
disconcerting from a body whose explanatory rhetoric insists that
everything is handled in the only existing objectively correct way. Because
it has happened in one-third of the cases over the last forty years, this
disagreement cannot be lightly dismissed. The Supreme Court of Canada
may be primarily in the business of deciding, but it is also in the business of
disagreeing.
Why does disagreement matter? At one level, it does not seem to
matter because there is still one winner and one statement of the law. But
because appeal court decisions are as much about reasons as they are about
outcomes, this is not convincing. Once, when formalism shaped the views
of both the Court and commentators, we would have said there was always
a correct answer and disagreement was ultimately about error-mostly
committed by the minority but sometimes by the majority, with a later court
correcting the mistake.' Although there are still some who talk in terms of
a single right answer,2 most judges and students of the law now treat the
I See Richard A. Primus, "Canon, Anti-Canon and Judicial Dissent" (1998) 58 Duke L.J. 243;
Anita S. Krishnakumar, "On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent" (2000) 52 Rutgers L. Rev. 781.
2 Ronald Dworkin is, of course, the most notable example. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
[VOL. 42, NO. I
Blocs, Swarms, and Outliers
judicial role as more complex, more nuanced, and more creative than that.3
Ultimately, judicial disagreement is important because it keeps more ideas
in play than those contained in the majority's reasons, ideas that sometimes
resurface either as the Court's new position or as a new set of modifying
considerations.4 In some circumstances, a divided decision may serve the
Court's purposes more adequately.5 Minority reasons, therefore, are often
much more than a "loser's history"; as Justice Scalia suggests, they
demonstrate that a national high court is a forum for debate and discussion,
a complex story with more than one plot line.6 But this also implies that the
more rigidly mechanical versions of stare decisis and binding precedent no
longer describe the Court's behaviour, and this is something of a double-
edged sword
The purpose of this article is to closely examine the phenomenon
of judicial disagreement on the modern Supreme Court of Canada. My
initial project is to track the ebb and flow of disagreement: there were years
of strident and bitter division succeeded by years of consensual near-
unanimity, which have now been replaced by new fragmentation; there have
been experiments with new and different decision-delivery styles, including
the "by the Court" decision or jointly authored reasons; there have been
reiterated disagreements by one or more specific judges supporting a
principled policy choice different from that of the majority; and there have
been pioneering disagreements that have sketched out new positions the
Court has now adopted, as well as last-stand solo defences of ideas the
Court has left behind. All of this occurs as part of a regular and repeated
process of expressing disagreement in a variety of forms and formats, which
this article aims to identify.
3 See e.g. Aharon Barak, "A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy"
(2002) 116 Harvard L. Rev. 16.
4 See e.g. Peter McCormick, "Second Thoughts: Supreme Court Citation of Dissents & Separate
Concurrences, 1949-1996" (2002) 81 Can. Bar Rev. 369 [McCormick, "Second Thoughts"] (regarding
the rather surprising frequency with which the modern Supreme Court of Canada cites minority
reasons).
See e.g. Peter McCormick, "The Political Jurisprudence of Hot Potatoes: A Comparison of the
Secession Reference and Bush v. Gore" (2002) 13 N.J.C.L. 271.
6 Antonin Scalia, "The Dissenting Opinion" (1994) J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 33.
It has also been suggested that we should understand all minority opinions less as an attempt
to persuade reluctant colleagues-something that is better accomplished through purely internal
communications-than as a signal to other actors and interests. See e.g. Tonja Jacobi, "The Judicial
Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets" (Paper presented to the 2003 Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, August 2003) [unpublished].
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My second project is to "penetrate" the way the Court organizes
itself around disagreement, the decision-delivery formats through which the
extent and scope of that disagreement is registered, and to demonstrate
how viewing the same historical record through this different lens
sometimes reinforces and sometimes alters the narrative. I suggest that the
Court displays eight different types of disagreement formats and that these
formats can be organized along two different axes such that the Court-by-
Court (or even year-by-year) statistics can tell a deeper story of what is
occurring within the institution at any given time.
This article concludes by putting the performance of the current
Court-the McLachlin Court-into this historical context and on this
conceptual map. Although the comments will necessarily be somewhat
tentative given that there are only three years of cases to analyze, they
identify both the specific kind of transition the Court is currently
experiencing and the trends suggested by three decades of experience.
II. DEFINING CERTAIN TERMS AND THE PERIOD
The central term in this analysis is "disagreement" rather than the
expected, and narrower, "dissent," despite the fact that dissent is the most
obvious form of judicial disagreement. In the reductively dichotomous
world of the appellate court, an appeal is either allowed or dismissed, with
the dissenter saying that the majority got it wrong. This is serious
disagreement indeed, and the fact that it happens two or three dozen times
a year should not blind us to the fact that there is something very
important, even inherently subversive, going on here-one of its own
members is telling the world that the court is mistaken. Usually the
dissenter acknowledges the seriousness of the action and seeks to contain
its implications by employing appropriate terminology, such as the
conventional opening phrase "with respect," but this simply confirms that
what is happening has sharp edges that need softening.
The second kind of disagreement is the separate concurrence
("special concurrence" in American terminology), in which the writer
agrees with the outcome but disagrees with, or at least does not completely
agree with, the reasons cited to support that outcome. If the outcome were
the most important part of an appellate decision, then a separate
concurrence would hardly matter. But on a national high court, the reasons
are always more important than the outcome; the reasoned opinion is not
merely "a device for communicating the outcome of a case," but also "a
candid and rigorous exercise in legal reasoning" that serves "important
[VOL. 42, NO. I
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social values" and "has value independent of the result."' 8 The outcome
affects only the immediate parties, but the reasons indicate to a broader
range of parties and actors what the Court may decide on comparable
issues in the future, and what differences from the immediate parties and
the immediate context will or will not carry probative value.
Some separate concurrences involve serious disagreement, and the
judges sometimes indicate this at the outset. In R. v. Potvin,9 although
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) wrote separate reasons that began: "I
have read the reasons of my colleague, Justice Sopinka, and must
respectfully dissent from his views on how appellate delay is treated under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," she in fact concurred as to
the result. Not only did she use the verbal formula of serious disagreement
("respectfully"), but she also used the term "dissent" as the label for a
difference that extends only to the reasons as opposed to the outcome.
The point is further illustrated by a recent set of Court decisions,
the Van der Peet trilogy, arguably the most important set of decisions to
date on the notion of Aboriginal rights in Canadian law. The three cases
questioned the extent to which an Aboriginal right could extend to the
protection of commercial activities that were prohibited under federal or
provincial legislation of more general application, and Chief Justice Lamer
used the occasion to redefine Aboriginal rights and to reformulate the legal
test establishing the legitimacy and the scope of the Aboriginal rights
applying to specific communities. In R. v. Van der Peet'° and R. v. N. T. C.
Smokehouse," the historical analysis resulting in the conviction of the
defendants was upheld. In R. v. Gladstone,2 however, the application of the
legal test through a parallel historical enquiry resulted in the finding that
the Aboriginal right encompassed commercial activities and the defendant
was acquitted. Justices McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6 wrote their own
reasons in all three cases, criticizing the majority's definition as rigid and its
test as excessively limiting and embodying a static and frozen approach to
Aboriginal rights. In the first two cases, they dissented from the decision of
the Court; in the third, they wrote separate concurrences-but the content
of their objections, and the nature and scope of their objections to the
outcome and reasons of the majority, were the same in all three cases.
8 Michael Wells, "French and American Judicial Opinions" (1994) 19 Yale J. Int'l L. 81 at 85.
9 [1993] 2 S.C.R. 880.
[1996]2 5CR. 507.
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 672.
12 [19961 2 S.C.R. 723.
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The differences expressed through separate concurrences can be
just as significant in their implications for the future evolution of legal
doctrine as the differences that take the form of dissent; because both are
examples of judicial disagreement about the appropriate outcome and
rationale, the two are appropriately conflated into a single category.'3 As
Justice Scalia puts it, "an opinion that gets the reasons wrong gets everything
wrong which it is the function of an opinion to produce." 4 In the discussion
that follows, both dissents and separate concurrences are treated as
examples ofjudicial disagreement and thus no breakdown between the two
categories will be provided. The numeric results in this article will therefore
vary from the statistics published by the Supreme Court of Canada, which
does not count a decision as non-unanimous unless one or more judges
dissents from the outcome.
The following analysis covers a period spanning roughly thirty-three
years, beginning with the Fauteux Chief Justiceship early in 1970 and
ending with the 2002 calendar year. This article thus focuses on the modern
Supreme Court of Canada; that is, the period since Bora Laskin became
Chief Justice in 1973, but the calculations begin with Laskin's appointment
as an associate justice in 1970, if only to establish that his Chief Justiceship
was the beginning of something new, rather than simply a continuation of
previous practices.
The Chief Justiceship of Bora Laskin was pivotal to the emergence
of the modern Supreme Court of Canada. The Court finally escaped from
the reputation for mediocrity that had dogged it for much of its first
century1 5 and from the captivity 16 of "sterile juridical servility to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council"' 7 to begin to sketch the bold and clear
lines of a purely Canadian jurisprudence-an escape that had been
anxiously awaited ever since appeals to the Privy Council ended in 1949. In
this period, a policy of larger panels and a practice of greater unanimity
replaced the haphazard pattern of narrow majorities in small divided
13For an extended discussion on this point, see Andrew Lynch, "Dissent: Toward a Methodology
for Measuring Judicial Disagreement in the High Court of Australia" (2002) 24 Sydney L. Rev. 470.
Scalia, supra note 6 at 33 [emphasis in original].
James G. Snell & Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the Institution
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
16 See Ian Bushnell, The Captive Court: A Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992). The allusion is, of course, to an article written by Bora Laskin.
See Bora Laskin, "The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians" (1951) 29 Can.
Bar Rev. 1038.
17 DeLloyd J. Guth, "Making Appellate Law Legal History and How It Sometimes Gets Written"
(1997) 24 Man. L.J. 697 at 706.
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panels-a practice that has prevailed, with some fracturing, ever since.18
Also in this period, the Court emerged as a significant presence on the
national political scene, highlighted by the Patriation Reference 9 and
capstoned by the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.20 After Laskin's Chief Justiceship, we take for granted a degree
of leadership, innovation, and visibility from the Court that nobody would
have dreamed of before Laskin. Starting the commentary three years
earlier for a close examination, and ten years earlier for some of the basic
statistical measures, simply provides a way to begin noting the difference
that Laskin made when he sat in the central chair.
III. DISAGREEMENT: WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS
The two major functions of a national high court are to give
authoritative resolution to disputes arising over major questions of national
law and to provide leadership to the lower courts. The Court does so by
dealing with cases that are brought to it on appeal from the provincial and
territorial courts of appeal and from the Federal Court of Appeal, 2t and by
resolving those appeals not simply with the declaration of an outcome but
also with a sometimes lengthy reasoned justification for the
appropriateness of that outcome. At one time, the Canadian legal
profession would have argued that these questions have only one
objectively correct answer that could be established through the technical
expertise of experienced professionals applying a rigorously constrained
methodology-in a word, "formalism. 22 But we now generally accept that
many of the questions brought to the Court do not have a single correct
answer, that a number of principles and values must be balanced very
carefully against each other, and that a wide range of social causes and
societal consequences link to the factual background of many disputes in
ways that judges must consider-in a word, "contextualism. 23
18 Peter McCormick, "The Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court of Canada: Analysis of
Appeals from Provincial Courts of Appeal, 1949-1990" (1992) 3 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 1.
19Reference Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [19811 1 S.C.R. 753.
20 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [Charterl.
21 The Court's caseload also includes reference cases (abstract questions posed directly to the
Court by the national government) and a small category of appeals that can come to it directly from
a provincial superior trial court, but both of these categories are small and typically do not account for
more than one or two cases per year.
22 See Frederick Schauer, "Formalism" (1988) 97 Yale L.J. 509.
23 See Bushnell, supra note 16 at 47-64.
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But if the Court is dealing with society's most divisive issues in a
time of rapid change by dealing with disputes that have to be understood
in the full context of broader circumstances, then it is hardly surprising that
they cannot always agree on the most appropriate result or the best way to
explain its appropriateness. Many deep values are frequently engaged, and
they do not always line up in precisely the same order or with precisely the
same emphasis for all judges. This alone would explain why disagreement
occurs and why it matters, but there are also other explanations.
When an appeal is heard, the justices of the Court do not just read
the background material, hear the oral arguments, and then "vote and run."
Just as there is more to the judicial product than an outcome, there is more
to the judicial process than voting. "Appellate adjudication is group
decision-making"2"; that is, an appeal court is a collegial enterprise, a
deliberative and reflective institution. The judges meet in conference
immediately after an appeal to exchange their first impressions, they
circulate drafts of judgments, send each other memos, and presumably visit
and revisit legal issues and precedents over coffee or in the judicial dining
room. Persuading others to one's point of view and listening to the
persuasion of others is not a perversion of the judicial process or a clouding
of some shining private intuition, but is rather the whole point of appellate
decision making. As Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager suggest:
Unless one presupposes that judges enter this process either fully aware of all points and
counterpoints, or obdurately fixed on both result and rationale without reference to the full
range of possible argumentation, it must be the case that some judges emerge from the
deliberative process with judgments about the appropriate result or rationale different from
their initial ones.25
Many differences and disagreements are accommodated within the
Court (or within the majority of the Court) through editorial changes or
subtle additions and subtractions and possibly even through negotiated
compromise.26 When these differences remain, they take the form of
dissents (differing on the outcome) or separate concurrences (differing on
24 Harry W. Jones, "Multitude of Counselors: Appellate Adjudication as Group Decision-
Making" (1980) 54 Tul. L. Rev. 545.
25 Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, "Unpacking the Court" (198) 96 Yale L.J. 82 at
101.
26 In American research, for example, it is widely acknowledged that Chief Justice Earl Warren,
anxious to achieve unanimity in the famous Brown v. Board of Education decision, secured his eighth
vote by agreeing to invent the word "desegregation" to replace the more obvious but politically
explosive "integration"; and he got the ninth vote by agreeing to insert the apparently innocuous but
probably unfortunate phrase "with all deliberate speed." See e.g. Bernard Schwartz, Decision: How the
Supreme Court Decides Cases (London: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 88-119.
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the reasons). In a sense, this is the part of deliberation that goes on after
the conferencing is over and, fortunately, it is this part that goes on in
public. Some might think of it as little more than a judge wanting to put
some reservations "on the record"-as an appeal to the "brooding spirit of
the ages" hoping that a future Court might one day revisit the matter, as a
call to some broader community (more likely among legal scholars than the
general public) to create the necessary research or pressure that will shift
the balance next time, or a last-ditch defence of an idea past its prime, but
it is all still part of a process of explanation and persuasion and, perhaps,
one of the more important parts.
A judge's decision to write minority reasons deserves to be treated
seriously. All judges know that a clear unanimous decision from the Court
is the most effective way to resolve a significant legal issue. All judges know
that disagreement clouds the authority of the Court's decision, and the
more extensive the disagreement, the darker the cloud. All judges know
that too much disagreement makes the Court look bad, if only because it
leaves the losers wondering if they deserved to lose, and because it invites
future litigation to see what the Court's position really is, especially after
new judicial appointments. All judges know the dangers of letting the best
be the enemy of the good. But despite all this, all judges will likely reach
the point where they feel that they cannot agree with the decision or the
reasons of the Court and must articulate why. Refusing to join the majority
reasons, even to the modest extent of writing a few apparently innocuous
qualifying paragraphs, is a deliberate choice and a significant action. The
purpose of this article is to establish a framework within which we can
consider these choices.
IV. DISAGREEMENT ON THE MODERN SUPREME COURT:
BROAD MEASURES
Disagreement on a large-panel court is a complex thing; it involves
several different elements that interact in complicated ways. The first
dimension is the most obvious and easy to measure: how often does the
Court deliver non-unanimous decisions? Between the beginning of 1970
and the end of 2002, the Court delivered a total of 3,326 decisions (just
under 101 decisions per year), of which 36.3 per cent (1,207 in total, or just
over 36 per year) were not unanimous. The total number of decisions
handed down per year fluctuated between a low of 67 (in 2000) and a high
of 139 (in 1990); and the total number of non-unanimous decisions
fluctuated between a low of 11 (in 1980) and a high of 68 (again in 1990).
The highest percentage of non-unanimous decisions was 56.6 per cent in
1995.
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To be strictly accurate, we should perhaps discuss these elements
in terms of percentages (percentages of total decisions or percentages of
total panel appearances), and this is the approach I have taken in other
studies of the Supreme Court of Canada. For present purposes, however,
I prefer to use the numbers themselves, which translate more accurately
into the actual experiences of the judges who served on the panels. If there
are, on average, 36 non-unanimous decisions per year, and the notional
average judge serves on six-ninths of them (in the 1960s) working up to
seventh-ninths of them (in and after the mid-1970s), then each judge serves
on twenty-four to twenty-eight panels per year that do not deliver a
unanimous decision-just over two each month. Viewing these numbers
from the perspective of the observer-citizen: assuming that one pays close
attention to the news about the Court (something that has been easier to
do since Laskin's Chief Justiceship), how often will one notice
disagreement on the national high court as it resolves a major issue of
national law? Over a span of thirty-three years, the answer is about three
times a month, although it has been as high as six and as low as one in some
years.
But this simple measure is only the beginning. Not all non-
unanimous Court decisions divide dichotomously between a majority
enunciating the decision and a minority objecting to the outcome or the
reasons, although most do, in fact, take this form. The second measure is
the number of minority opinions written by members of the panel. Other
things being equal, one year on the Court can be thought of as more
divisive than another if the same number of non-unanimous decisions
generates a larger number of minority opinions. The number of minority
opinions per case can be as low as one, as in the dichotomous decisions
described above; it can be just under one half of the size of the panel (four
judges on a nine-judge panel or three on a seven-judge panel, each writing
their own preferred outcome-plus-reasons); or it can go even higher, when
the court fragments so badly that no statement of outcome-plus-reasons
draws the signatures of a majority. On average, the 36 non-unanimous
decisions per year have drawn 54 sets of minority reasons, varying from a
low of 13 (in 1980) to a high of 122 (in 1990). On average, for every year
between 1970 and 2002, the notional average member of the Court wrote
six dissents or concurrences, or one every second month.
[VOL. 42, NO. I
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Figure 1: Disagreement on the Supreme Court of Canada
However, there is a third dimension: some minority reasons draw
the signature not only of their author, but of one or more judges on the
panel, as many as three others, assuming a nine-judge panel that splits
dichotomously with the smallest possible majority. In fact, just as it is true
that most divided panels split dichotomously, it is also true that most
minority reasons are solo efforts; this simply makes it more important to
notice when the multi-signature minority opinions occur. Other things
being equal, one year on the Court can be thought of as more divided than
another to the extent that the same number of minority opinions delivered
in the same number of non-unanimous decisions draws more signatures,
because this means that the average majority is smaller (and the level of
disagreement higher) than the first numbers had suggested. On average,
the 36 non-unanimous decisions with their 54 minority reasons have drawn
95 signatures, varying from a low of 23 (in 1980) to a high of 193 (in 1990).
The notional average judge could therefore write or sign a set of minority
reasons about once a month.
As shown in Figure 1, these numbers can be turned into a simple
line graph. The variation is quite striking, and it does not translate easily
into a story of either steadily growing unanimity or persistently increasing
fragmentation. The dark figure shows the number of judges disagreeing
2004]
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(writing or signing) each year since 1970; the mid-grey figure shows the
number of minority reasons (dissents and separate concurrences) written
each year; and the light-grey figure shows the number of non-unanimous
decisions delivered each year. The three stories are obviously variants of a
single tale. Sometimes (as in the early 1980s) the gap between "minority
opinions delivered" and "non-unanimous decisions" almost disappears,
while sometimes (for example, through the mid-to-late 1970s) the gap
between "judges disagreeing" and "minority opinions delivered" swells
considerably. Although the three are not identical, they are similar.
The triple line in Figure 1 indicates a number of critical events or
periods that significantly altered the disagreement among the Court. The
first is the 1970s, which show a one-time jump to a new plateau for all three
measures. The second is 1980, when the disagreement levels plummet to
the lowest level in the history of the Court-not for a single year, but for a
string of years. The third is the period from 1980 to 1995 (with a curious
one-year drop in 1992, which I will treat as a statistical blip rather than an
explanation-demanding event), when the levels of disagreement on all three
measures rise steadily from all-time lows to all-time highs. The fourth
period is the sudden reversal in and after 1997, when all three measures
(working again in tandem) fall below the thirty-eight-year average,
although the "judges disagreeing" line is dropping more slowly than the
others.
It is not difficult to hazard guesses to explain each of the four
critical shifts. The first coincides with the appointment of Bora Laskin, the
judge who arguably taught the Ontario Court of Appeal how to write
dissents; the impact increases after Justice Dickson joined the
Spence/Laskin duo. The second may identify the consolidation of the
Laskin Court with the appointment of Justice Lamer (or possibly Justice
Chouinard). The third presumably reflects the growing impact of the
Charter and its transformation of the public role of the Court. Finally, the
fourth may respond to the departure of Justice La Forest in 1997 (and
possibly, although less plausibly, the death of Justice Sopinka in 1997). But
before we can pinpoint the shifts and swings in a way that would make these
conjectures more plausible, it is necessary to refine the somewhat crude
measures that have been employed in this section.
V. DISAGREEMENT ON THE MODERN SUPREME COURT:
FINE-TUNING CATEGORIES
The number of minority opinions delivered and the number of
judges writing or signing minority reasons are two useful measures of
disagreement, but in the form in which they appear in Figure 1, they share
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one serious flaw: they represent aggregates across sometimes dozens of
specific cases. All single-number aggregates necessarily blur distinctions; all
averages obscure the extent and the frequency of the extremes. To perform
operations with the aggregate numbers (for example, 1.5 minority opinions
per non-unanimous decision or 1.7 signatures per minority opinion) simply
compounds the difficulty. As is the case for the average age of a room
containing only infants and grandparents, we may calculate an accurate
average only to discover that no single example actually matches it.
Thus the operating premise is that Court decisions are the collegial
product of an interacting panel. However, this product includes both the
unanimous, majority, or plurality decision of the Court, as well as the
minority reasons. This product also indicates the simple fact that there were
dissents or separate concurrences, as well as the way that the members of
the panel have organized themselves around the various sets of reasons. A
nine-judge panel with a single holdout expressing reservations is one thing;
the same panel with three judges signing the same set of differing reasons
is another; and the same panel with three judges writing their own
completely separate objections is yet another. To some extent, we may
think of unanimity as success and division as failure-after all, the
application of professional techniques to objective material is supposed to
bring certainty and finality to the process-but we must still deal with the
fact that there are distinctly different ways in which the unanimity effort can
fail.
I will therefore suggest a set of eight categories to which every
specific example of a non-unanimous decision may unambiguously be
allocated by a consideration of the number and size of the writing
fragments into which the panel divides. I will then locate each category on
a conceptual map that will structure the way that judicial disagreement can
be discussed as discrete sets of actual decisions, rather than abstract
aggregates of strings of numbers. This, in turn, will be used to generate a
year-by-year breakdown for each of the five Chief Justiceships, with the
shifting proportions of the various categories translating into movement on
the conceptual map. This closer look will be used to characterize each Chief
Justiceship, as well as to confirm, qualify, or refute the suggested
explanation of each of the four critical shifts in Figure 1.
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Figure 2: Schematic Diagram of Disagreement Formats "The Fan"
The basic logic of the categories is straightforward. Whenever the
panel loses unanimity, i.e. delivers two or more sets of outcome-plus-
reasons drawing the signatures of one or more of the panel members,we
can describe the panel in terms of the fragments created by the divided
signatures, from the largest to the smallest. A nine-judge panel with a single
dissident is an 8/1 combination, a seven-judge panel with one dissenter and
one separate concurrence is a 5/1/1 combination, and so on. As a result, all
similar formats can be grouped into categories.
The first category is labelled "outlier disagreement" and describes
the lone judge who breaks what is otherwise a unanimous panel to write a
dissent or separate concurrence. The panel fragments will then be 4/1 (for
a five-judge panel), or 6/1, or 8/1.27 This is, obviously, the minimum possible
level of disagreement-one disagreeing judge writing one alternate set of
27
It is rare, but not impossible, to get even-number combinations for outlier disagreement, such
as 5/1 or 7/1. Such combinations are seldom created intentionally but sometimes result when one or
more of the panel members do not participate in the decision for various reasons, including poor
health.
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reasons. A Court for which disagreement never rises above this level has a
very high degree of unity, even if the number of cases in which unanimity
is broken may be fairly high.
The schematic diagram locates the various categories of
disagreement on two different axes. The horizontal axis reflects the number
of judges disagreeing with the decision of the Court, rising from "low" on
the left to "high" on the right. The vertical axis reflects the number of
minority opinions that have been delivered by the disagreeing judge or
judges, from "low" on the bottom to "high" on the top. With one judge
writing one opinion, the outlier disagreement is located at the lower left,
close to the origin-but not of course at the origin, which would signify no
disagreeing judges and no minority opinions, or a unanimous decision.
From this minimal starting point, the logical progression can go one
of two ways: "up" toward the upper-right comer (where the categories of
disagreement are identified in italics) or "out" along the horizontal axis
(where the categories of disagreement are identified in boldface). Outlier
disagreement, as the smallest possible nugget of either type of
disagreement, is indicated by both boldface and italics. These two alternate
tracks represent the two different answers to the following question: What
happens when the single disagreeing judge is no longer alone or when one
or more other judges disagree as well?
The first possibility is that the other judge or judges will sign on
with the first one, or vice versa-a single minority opinion will still be
delivered, but it may have one, two, or three additional signatures. The
label for this category is "compact disagreement": as the disagreement
grows, it continues to be organized compactly behind a single set of
reasons. Combinations of 7/2, 6/2, or 5/2 represent compact decisions, as
does 6/3- logically the latter is somewhat further along the horizontal axis
(morejudges are expressing disagreement) but not higher along the vertical
axis (no more minority opinions are being delivered). For simplicity, I will
identify a single extended zone of compact disagreement.
As the level of disagreement continues to grow relative to the size
of the panel, the category labelled "polarized disagreement" results. The
logic is that the panel (or the Court, if it is a full nine-judge panel) is as
close to evenly divided as it can be, with a single vote separating the
prevailing majority decision of the Court from the multi-signature dissent
or separate concurrence. The combinations of 5/4, 4/3, and 3/2 exhaust the
category of polarized disagreement. Logically, no further move along the
horizontal axis is possible: if the minority gains one more signature, it
becomes the majority, and the two groups simply change places without
moving to another category.
2004]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
The boldface outlier/compact/polarized track represent the
polarization option: as the number of disagreeing judges grows, they pack
behind an increasingly strong alternate viewpoint. At the extreme-the
one-vote majority-any change can tip the balance and create a new
majority, whether it is a question of a single judge persuaded to swing his
or her vote or a new appointment when a senior judge retires. This arguably
describes the current U.S. Supreme Court, two evenly matched forces with
the balance tilting according to the most recent president's ideological
inclination.28
But there is another possibility. Judges may choose to defect from
the majority simply to write their own reasons. More disagreeing judges
does not necessarily mean more signatures for a single alternative opinion;
it can also mean the generation of more alternative opinions. The label for
this category is "swarm disagreement," and the picture that it is intended
to convey is a majority bloc accompanied by a swarm of solo-authored
minority reasons, for example, combinations of 3/1/1, 5/1/1, or 7/1/1. Of
course, so are 4/1/1/1 or 6/1/1/1 or even 5////1-although these are
logically further up the italicized track, they are still embraced by the swarm
label that is, like the compact label, an extended zone along the track and
not a single point on it.
As the number of alternatives grows, and the panel members attach
themselves to those alternatives, the next logical possibility is that the Court
will fragment so as to generate no single set of outcome-plus-reasons that
is capable of drawing the signatures of a majority of the panel. In the
reductively dichotomous world of an appeal court, these fragments still
amount to a vote indicating whether the appeal is allowed or dismissed-
crudely, who won-but it does not identify a rationale that will enjoy
majority support when a similar case arrives before the Court. These are
plurality decisions. In the United States, the prevailing doctrine is that "for
an opinion to become the law of the land, at least five members of the
Court must join it," which means that plurality decisions "lack precedential
value. '29 No such formal rule exists in Canada-the Court's most frequently
28 See e.g. Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers (New York: Random House, 1998).
29 See e.g. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, "Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational
Role of Amici Curiae" in Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman, eds., Supreme Court Decision-
Making: New Institutionalist Approaches (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) 215 at 217, n. 10.
But see Mark Thurmon, "When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme
Court Plurality Decisions" (1992) 42 Duke L.J. 419.
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cited cases include several such plurality decisions 3 -but it is probably still
true that less fragmented decisions generally carry greater precedential
weight than more fragmented decisions. This is a fundamental axiom of
judicial impact theory,3 and it is one reason why the phenomenon of
disagreement matters and why we think that a single disagreeing judge or
a string of them can have an impact even when they lose in the vote.
Since plurality decisions must logically involve three or more
fragments, some or all of which draw more than a single signature, it is not
strictly located against the arrow that describes the outlier/swarm/fragment
track. Combinations such as 4/3/2, 3/3/3, 4/3/1/1, or 3/2/2 all represent
plurality decisions, and therefore "fragment disagreement." If the
proliferation of swarm disagreement might suggest to the public that
something curious is happening on the Court, a growing number of
fragment disagreements signal to the legal community that the Court is
unable to give a clear direction to some areas of national law.
The most extreme form of fragmentation is "seriatim
disagreement"-that is, a decision in which every member (or almost every
member) of the panel writes separate reasons, and those outcomes are
simply summed to generate a vote that gives a result. In a pure seriatim
decision, there is no exchange or acknowledgment between the various
separate reasons, no clear indication as to which of them might count as the
lead decision that lower courts and future litigants would be advised to take
primary guidance, and therefore subsequent legal arguments can cherry-
pick for the most precisely convenient wording or examples. Seriatim
decisions were once part of the regular stock in trade of the Court, but
since the 1920s, their use has declined sharply.3 2 The Court's last pure
seriatim decision was Hossack Estate v. Hertz Drive Yourself Stations of
Ontario Ltd.,33 delivered in 1965. Thus, in this article, the label for this
category is more metaphoric, catching the most extreme forms of
disagreement: for example, the nine-judge panels that delivered seven sets
30 See Peter McCormick, "What Supreme Court Cases Does the Supreme Court Cite?: Follow-
up Citations on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993" (1996) 7 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 451; Peter
McCormick, "The Supreme Court Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-up Citation on the Supreme Court
of Canada, 1989-1993" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 453.
See e.g. Stephen Wasby, "Toward Impact Theory: An Inventory of Hypotheses" in Theodore
Lewis Becker & Malcolm Feely, eds., The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions: Empirical Studies (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Charles Johnson & Bradley C. Canon, Judicial Policies:
Implementation and Impact (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984).
32 Claire L'Heureux-DubM, "The Length and Plurality of Supreme Court of Canada Decisions"
(1990) 28 Alta. L. Rev. 581.
33 [19661 5.C.R. 28.
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of reasons, the seven-judge panels that delivered six, and the five-judge
panels in 1990 that delivered five, although the current practice is for the
separately writing judges to indicate where they stand in relation to at least
some of their writing colleagues. This category of disagreement accounts
for a very small group of cases, but its fragmentation of explanation is so
extreme as to invite its own label.
Two other categories exist between the boldfaced polarization track
and the italicized fragmentation track. The first is "transition
disagreement," a term which simply means that it is located midway
between the two tracks. Examples of this category include 4/2/1, 6/2/1, and
5/2/2, which is too compact to be a swarm and too much of a swarm to be
compact. Anecdotal reasons suggest this category is more like the compact
form of disagreement because the most frequent single example of x/2/1 is
also the most frequent single example of an isolated 3--that is, Laskin,
Spence, and Dickson, the "L-S-D" connection. In the discussion that
follows, however, I will assume that because it involves more than two sets
of reasons delivered by the Court, it is conceptually more akin to the
swarm/fragment set than the compact/polarized set.
The final category, also located between the two major tracks, but
further along the horizontal axis than even polarized disagreement, is "tie-
breaker disagreement." It describes a case with an even split between two
sets of judges, and a single tie-breaker deciding which of the two is the
(plurality) decision of the Court. 4 In one sense, this is another form of the
plurality decision that I have labelled fragment disagreement, but it is
extreme (and unusual) enough to earn a separate category.
Table 1 provides a category-by-category breakdown for the 1,170
non-unanimous decisions delivered by the Court between January 1, 1970
and December 31, 2002. The most common disagreement format is
polarized disagreement-that is, the minimum one-vote majority dividing
a dichotomous Court-with almost exactly one-quarter of the total (296).
This is followed fairly closely by the number of outlier disagreements (270)
and of compact disagreements (236)-that is, just over two-thirds of all
non-unanimous decisions of the Court are strung out in three fairly equal
clumps along the polarization axis. The numbers for the other elements of
the fragmentation axis are much smaller-127 examples of swarm
disagreement and 118 of fragment disagreement, with only a handful of
In some circumstances, the tie-breaker may wind up effectively writing the reasons on
narrower, or even different, grounds than those preferred by either large faction. The classic example
is Calder v. British Columbia, 11973] S.C.R. 313, in which Justice Pigeon's technical finding that Calder
had never sought the B.C. government's permission before launching the suit forestalled the close
investigation of Aboriginal title, a point on which the two three-judge blocs had differed.
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seriatim-like decisions (19). The two intermediate categories are smaller
yet, with only 59 examples of transition disagreement and 45 tie-breakers.
Table 1: Frequency of Types of Disagreement
Supreme Court 1970-2002
FORMAT EXAMPLES
SERIATIM 19
FRAGMENT 118
TIE BREAKER 45
SWARM 127
OUTLIER 270
TRANSITION 59
COMPACT 236
POLARIZED 296
ALL NON-UNANIMOUS DECISIONS 1,170
Even in the form of this broad-brush total, the categories in Table
1 reveal some interesting information. One of them, easy to overlook at
first glance but quite profound in its implications, is the fact that so many
of the non-unanimous decisions involve two or more judges joining to
organize their disagreement. Every example of fragment, tie-breaker,
compact, or polarized disagreement involves one judge or a group ofjudges
writing joint minority reasons that carry more than one signature. Almost
two-thirds of all non-unanimous decisions (752 out of 1,170 or 64.3 per
cent) involve some cooperation between disagreeing judges, some pooled
effort and deliberation resulting in multiple signatures.
There is no question as to why the writer of the decision of the
Court would want to retain or gain signatures, preferably as many as
possible. If the number ofjudges willing to sign drops below four, the writer
may have lost the majority-at best, the result is the fragmented and mildly
embarrassing situation of a plurality judgment; at worst, the writer is now
writing a minority opinion, while someone else writes the decision. Even if
the majority is secure, the more votes the better-a solid six is better than
a marginal five, although a unanimous nine is best of all. It is this
understanding that signatures are worth something to the writing judge,
and that the other judges therefore enjoy some leverage over the final
See Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, "All or Nothing: Explaining the Size of Supreme
Court Majorities" (2000) 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1225.
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content of the reasons, that has shaped much of the recent American
research. The conference notes of recently retired judges have been
explored as a way to study how votes and signatures shift as the process
moves from post-hearing conference to final decision, and how judges
bargain and threaten just to nudge the majority reasons toward some more
desirable position.36 Maximizing the winning coalition is a good part of
crafting the law; learning how to use the resulting leverage is how even
junior judges can sometimes still have an impact on the evolution of the
law.37
There are, however, no parallel incentives on the minority side.
Imagine yourself as a judge who discovers at conference that the majority
has taken a track that you find to be mistaken, whether it is a matter of the
outcome, or of developing the expanded rationale that will explain the
reasons so as to provide useful leadership to lower courts. Imagine that
your colleagues are unwilling to be persuaded to change their course or to
pull back on their reasons. Imagine further that you believe the mistake to
be important enough, to carry such negative potential long-term
consequences, that silence does not seem an appropriate option. When one
reaches this point, one has decided to write a minority opinion.
The great luxury of writing in disagreement is that one is able to
express arguments that may lead to the perfect outcome both candidly and
fully, and to do so with a clarity and singleness of purpose that a judge in
the majority can seldom afford for fear of losing signatures. Nor need there
be any worry (as every judge writing for the majority must worry) that lower
court judges will misconstrue the rhetoric and be carried in directions or to
lengths that were not intended; it is decisions of the Court, not minority
opinions, that are normally thought to constitute binding judicial
authority.38 As U.S. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes once wrote, "It's
more fun to write a dissenting opinion ... because you can just go off and
express your view without regard to anybody else."39 There is some freedom
36 See Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme
Court: The Collegial Game (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
3 7 See e.g. Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, "The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Mathematics" (1996) 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 63; Lynn A. Baker, "Interdisciplinary Due
Diligence: The Case for Common Sense in the Search for the Swing Justice" (1996) 70 S. Cal. L. Rev.
187; Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, "'Duel' Diligence: Second Thoughts About the Supremes as the
Sultans of Swing" (1996) 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 219.
38 Although, in recent years, the Court has frequently cited minority reasons in the same manner
and apparently with the same weight as decisions of the Court. See McCormick, "Second Thoughts",
supra note 4.
Sandra L. Wood & Gary M. Gansle, "Seeking a Strategy: William J. Brennan's Dissent
Assignments" (1997) 81 Judicature 73 at 73.
[VOL. 42, NO. I
Blocs, Swarms, and Outliers
in the writing of a solo minority opinion, a freedom that may be all the
more welcome because the responsibility of writing major decisions is not
evenly distributed among the members of the Court.
It is not an obvious option, and therefore a highly intriguing one,
for two or more judges in the minority to join their efforts-to make
compromises or to surrender some of the ideas they would like to
defend-simply for the sake of having a co-author or co-signer. The swarm
form of disagreement seems a more natural response than the compact
form as a second or third judge finds herself outside the decision-writing
majority. Perhaps more signatures make a minority opinion more likely to
be taken into account in the future, but absent any empirical evidence, this
is sheer conjecture, no more or no less credible than the alternative
assertion that the passionate vigour of uncompromised solo argument
makes it more attractive to revisit. Because the Canadian legal literature
has no tradition of honouring the great dissents, we cannot check the list to
see how many are and how many are not solo efforts.4°
VI. DISAGREEMENT ON THE MODERN SUPREME COURT:
APPLYING THE CATEGORIES
I will now apply the conceptual map of disagreement types as a
background to the evolution of judicial divisions on the Supreme Court of
Canada since 1970. This will expand the thin narrative provided in Figure
1, which graphed three very crude measures of judicial disagreement over
the period.
A. The Fauteux Court
The focus of this article is the modem Court, and since the
accepted defining point for the beginning of this is Bora Laskin's
appointment as Chief Justice, I have already conceded that the Fauteux
Court does not qualify. However, the reason for starting with a brief
description of disagreement behaviour under Fauteux is twofold: first, it
introduces the methodology; and second, it sets the stage for the rather
dramatic swings that follow.
40 Some work has been done along these lines in the United States. See e.g. Primus, supra note
1; Krishnakumar, supra note 1.
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Table 2: Frequency of Types of Non-Unanimous Decisions
The Fauteux Court 1970-73
The first thing to look at is the bottom row and whether those
numbers are rising, falling, or staying steady. The second indication is the
outlier row and whether the larger cells tend to be above or below it. For
the Fauteux Court, the number of outliers is fairly steady (11, plus or minus
4, straight across) and the weight of the table is down toward polarization
rather than up toward fragmentation. In the immediate case, this is a little
misleading as the average size of a non-unanimous panel on the Fauteux
Court was 6.1 (the average for all panels was about 5.6) and a full two-
thirds were the legal minimum five-judge panels. Five-judge panels do not
really give the categories enough space to work-all but five of the
polarized panels were 3/2 splits. Because one aspect of Laskin's influence
on the Court was a move toward larger panels (the average size of a non-
unanimous panel on the Laskin Court was over 7.5), this problem will not
persist into the later sections.
The major part of the disagreement story on the Fauteux Court is
provided by Justices Laskin, Spence, and Hall, and in a more attenuated
way, Justice Pigeon. These four judges account for more than two-thirds of
the disagreement activity on the Court, Laskin himself accounting for a full
quarter. But they disagree in a surprisingly disorganized fashion, more
likely to write in parallel than to write together. R. v. John4 is a good
example: the fourjudges are the swarm in a 5/1/11111 Ritchie decision. Only
once, in Fraser v. Sykes,42 did all four join to become a four-judge dissenting
bloc on a polarized Court. Although Table 2 gives the impression of a
[1971] S.C.R. 781.
42 [1974] S.C.R. 526.
1970 1971 1972 1973 ALL
SERIATIM 0 0 0 0 0
FRAGMENT 0 1 2 1 5
TIE-BREAKER 0 1 1 3 6
SWARM 3 1 9 0 13
OUTLIER 7 15 9 13 44
TRANSITION 1 1 1 0 3
COMPACT .3 4 2 2 11
POLARIZED 6 12 11 9 38
TOTAL 20 35 37 28 120
Blocs, Swarms, and Outliers
closely divided Court with a strong, polarized minority, it is actually the
artifact of the small size of the typical panel. The same factor explains why
the number of outliers is so much higher for the Fauteux Court than at any
other time-36.7 per cent of all non-unanimous decisions compared to 23.2
per cent overall. In other words, on a five-judge panel, the journey from
outlier to polarized is a single step.
B. The Laskin Court
The Laskin Chief Justiceship was unusual for a number of reasons,
but most strikingly for the fact that Laskin was appointed Chief Justice in
the first place. The prevailing rule for becoming Chief Justice, explaining
all but two of the previous incumbents, had been seniority, but Laskin was
the sixth senior on the Court, and the passing over of the most obvious
candidate (Justice Martland) created tensions from the beginning.
However, the differences ran deeper than personal slights and hurt feelings;
more important was the fact that Laskin was an advocate of the new
("contextualist") judicial style, while Martland was a defender of the old
("formalist") style. The first half of the Laskin Chief Justiceship carries the
clear marks of the battle joined.
Table 3: Frequency of Types of Non-Unanimous Decisions
The Laskin Court 1974-84
'74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 ALL
SERIATIM 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
FRAGMENT 6 8 4 2 2 5 0 1 3 0 1 32
TIEBREAKER 2 2 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 11
SWARM 5 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 9
OUTLIER 6 5 13 5 5 10 3 5 4 7 4 67
TRANSITION 0 1 3 1 2 5 2 1 0 3 0 18
COMPACT 7 12 13 19 11 15 3 3 5 3 3 94
POLARIZED 13 18 8 17 9 12 3 5 6 8 3 102
TOTAL 40 48 43 46 33 48 11 15 18 22 11 335
Disagreement levels jumped from the beginning; they included
unusually high levels of compact and polarized disagreements, but the
lowest levels of outlier disagreement for the three decades. Because Laskin
caused a sharp increase in the size of the panels, reserving five-judge panels
for the less controversial matters, these categories can be used more
confidently than was the case above. The most frequent cluster of judges
2004]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
creating the compact or polarized disagreements was the Laskin, Spence,
and Dickson combination-it was during this period, and not earlier under
Fauteux, that the L-S-D connection was formed and polished-although
for a Chief Justice, Laskin wrote an unusually high number of the outlier
minority opinions as well, averaging one per year. Thus, high disagreement
levels characterized the Court, with the Chief Justice appearing frequently
on the losing side.
The numbers in Table 3 fully confirm the dramatic picture in Figure
1: the 1980 calendar year saw an abrupt transformation of the Court and a
sharp drop in disagreement levels. The proportion of outlier disagreements
jumped from one-sixth to one-third, although the total number of non-
unanimous decisions was cut by well over one-half. The explanation is
simple: some time in 1979, Chief Justice Laskin won "The Great Laskin-
Martland War" although on purely statistical indicators it is unclear
whether it was the appointment of Justice Chouinard or Justice Lamer that
turned the critical corner. Laskin wrote or signed 120 minority opinions in
his first six terms, but wrote only 9 after January 1, 1980. One might have
expected that the remaining disagreement levels show the last-ditch
resistance of the Martland loyalists, but in fact the patterns are less
aftershocks and more foreshadowing. Most of the writing and signing of
minority reasons comes not from the waning "Diefenbaker trio" of Justices
Ritchie, Martland, and Judson, but rather from judges like Estey, McIntyre,
Lamer, Wilson, and Dickson himself, who would all be maj or players on the
Dickson Court.
C. The Dickson Court
When Dickson became Chief Justice, he inherited a Court whose
disagreement levels were lower than they had ever been in its history. This
being the case, it was hardly to be expected that dissent would stay at such
a low level, but it is still somewhat surprising how steadily and quickly it
rose. The 48 non-unanimous decisions in 1989 were as many as the Court
had seen in a single year under Laskin (in 1975 and 1979), and 1990 set an
all-time record of disagreement. This is surprising because Dickson also
inherited one of the most junior courts in this century, one on which the
average years of service actually dropped under his Chief Justiceship, and
juniority tends to correlate with lower levels of disagreement.
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Table 4: Frequency of Types of Non-Unanimous Decisions
The Dickson Court 1984-90
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 TOTAL
SERIATIM 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 6
FRAGMENT 1 2 5 5 6 10 9 38
TIEBREAKER 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 7
SWARM 0 2 5 7 2 7 10 33
OUTLIER 2 4 7 11 9 10 7 50
TRANSITION 1 0 0 4 1 2 10 33
COMPACT 5 4 3 2 6 6 11 37
POLARIZED 3 5 5 1 8 10 19 51
TOTAL 12 19 26 31 32 48 67 235
The shape of the non-unanimous decisions of the Dickson Court
were also completely different. Fragment and swarm disagreements were
proportionately more common than for any other Chief Justiceship. This
may reflect the way that rapid turnover had transformed the Court through
the Laskin period and into the Dickson period: six new faces on the Court
in the last six years under Laskin and seven more in the six years under
Dickson created a "revolving door" Court without parallel in its history. It
is perhaps not surprising that it took some time for the dissidents to gel into
more coherent groups. Only toward the end of the period does the more
long-standing pattern re-emerge, with the larger cells toward the bottom of
the table-that is, toward the compact/polarization track rather than the
swarm/fragmented track. Four individuals account for just over half of all
occasions when a judge wrote or signed a minority opinion: Wilson (109
times), McIntyre (77 times), Lamer (76 times), and L'Heureux-Dub6 (70
times). The latter is the most surprising, because Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
was appointed almost halfway through the Dickson Chief Justiceship; if we
project that disagreement level over the entire six years, she would have
outpaced Justice Wilson.
Table 5: The Impact of the Charter on Disagreement Levels and Types
The Dickson Court 1984-90
CHARTER PUBLIC CRIMINAL PRIVATE TOTAL
ALL CASES 138 151 242 138 669
NON-UNANIMOUS DECISIONS 92 46 60 38 236
THREE OR MORE OPINIONS 57 15 18 8 98
PLURALITY DECISIONS 27 11 8 6 52
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It was suggested in the first section that the probable explanation
for the steady rise in disagreement levels on the Court was the growing
presence of Charter cases. Table 5 strongly supports this conclusion by
dividing the caseload into four subdivisions. The 531 non-Charter cases
generated 144 non-unanimous decisions, of which 41 included multiple
(three or more) opinions and 25 failed to generate a set of outcome-plus-
reasons that was signed by a majority of the panel. The 138 Charter cases
generated 92 non-unanimous decisions, of which 57 resulted in multiple
opinions and 27 failed to generate a majority decision. Put differently, a
Charter case was two and a half times as likely to generate a non-unanimous
decision than any other kind of case, and a non-unanimous Charter decision
was two and a quarter times as likely to result in multiple opinions. If the
Charter cases are taken out of the equation, the disagreement numbers and
patterns for the Dickson Court would have looked very much like those of
the last years of the Laskin Court.43
D. The Lamer Court
The Lamer Court continued the high and increasing disagreement
levels of the later Dickson Court; on a straight count of the simple
measures (number of non-unanimous decisions, number of minority
opinions written, and number of judges writing and signing minority
reasons), the numbers from 1990 are the highest ever. One development
worth noting is the end of the "revolving door" Court; after the first couple
of years (the retirement of Justice Wilson, and the short term of Justice
Stevenson), the Court went almost five years without a new face, a level of
stability that had been lacking for more than a decade. The U.S. literature
uses the term "natural court" to describe the period over which
membership remains absolutely constant. The Lamer Court was a natural
court for 4.88 years, from the appointment of Justice Major to the
retirement of Justice La Forest.
Two developments can be traced through Table 6. The first is the
fact that after 1996, the overall levels of disagreement began to decline to
more moderate levels. The second is that from the same period or slightly
earlier, the larger cells in the table start to move downward, away from the
fragment/swarm level and toward the compact/polarized level. That is,
although judges began to disagree somewhat less often, they also began to
Between 1980 and 1984, about one decision in every five was non-unanimous. Between 1986
and 1990, about one non-Charter decision in every four was non-unanimous, while two of every three
Charter cases generated minority opinions.
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organize their disagreement more regularly behind a single author, such
that the Court's decisions took the form of a dichotomous conversation
rather than of a series of judges taking exception to specific elements of the
majority decision. Thus, although swarm disagreement constituted a larger
proportion of the Lamer Court's non-unanimous decisions than was the
case for any other Chief Justiceship, these swarms tail off after 1996.
Table 6: Frequency of Types of Non-Unanimous Decisions
The Lamer Court 1991-99
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ALL
SERIATIM 1 0 4 1 4 1 0 0 0 11
FRAGMENT 9 4 4 3 8 4 2 4 2 40
TIEBREAKER 3 2 4 3 1 2 2 1 1 19
SWARM 7 12 10 10 4 11 8 4 1 67
OUTLIER 10 8 21 1 18 11 8 4 9 90
TRANSITION 2 2 6 6 1 2 3 1 1 24
COMPACT 8 5 6 5 7 10 8 11 11 71
POLARIZED 4 3 12 14 17 7 10 4 6 77
TOTAL 44 36 67 43 60 48 41 29 31 399
The major divisions on the Lamer Court are a story that has been
told several times. For much of the period, there was a reasonably solid
bloc comprised of Justices Lamer, Sopinka, Cory, Iacobucci, and Major
that tended to prevail on most (but by no means all) major issues. A similar
declaration, however, cannot be made of the other four-Justices La
Forest, L'Heureux-Dub, Gonthier, and McLachlin-who formed much
less of a bloc.44 Not only did each of them tend to join with the majority on
certain issues, but even when this was not the case, they tended to write
their own reasons rather than organize into a single alternative position.
Justice Gonthier was the least likely of the four to write and the most likely
to sign on with another outsider, usually Justice La Forest; Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 was the most likely to write and the least likely to sign on
with anyone else; Justice McLachlin was more likely to write and less likely
to sign on than anyone except L'Heureux-Dub6. This behaviour explains
the fragmentation in Table 6.
Disagreement levels drop sharply in the last two years of the Lamer
Court, and at first glance the most obvious explanation is the resignation
4 4 See Peter McCormick, "Birds of a Feather: Alliances and Influences on the Lamer Court 1991-
1997" (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 339.
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of Justice La Forest in September 1997, followed by the death of Justice
Sopinka in November 1997. In a short period of time, the Court lost its
second and fourth most senior members, both of whom were active within
the Court and both of whom have unquestionably left a significant imprint
on Canadian law. But neither was unusually prolific in the writing or signing
of minority opinions. Over the first seven full terms of the Lamer Court,
there were, on average, 130 occasions each term when a judge wrote or
signed minority reasons, for an average of about 14.5 per judge. But
Sopinka put himself outside the majority only 15.3 times per year, and La
Forest was slightly lower at 15.0. Clearly neither Justice Sopinka nor Justice
La Forest drove the high disagreement levels on the early Lamer Court.
Yet the sharp drop after the fall of 1997 remains, from 130
disagreeing judges per year to 70. Justices Sopinka and La Forest account
at most for half of this decline, although the impact of their departure on
disagreement is offset by the fact that their replacements also disagreed
with the majority, albeit at lower rates-7 times per year for Justice
Bastarache, 4 for Justice Binnie. The real factor driving down the
disagreement rates was the altered behaviour of the remaining members of
the Court: McLachlin's disagreements per year fell by 12 (from 22 to 10),
L'Heureux-Dub6's and Cory's by 7, and Iacobucci's by 6. It might be that
this is a by-product of the departure of Justices La Forest and
Sopinka-perhaps because Sopinka wrote unusually provocative decisions
that led more judges to join a disagreement or perhaps because La Forest
was better at rallying the opposition. Both suggestions, however, are belied
by the fact that before 1997, disagreement on the Court was higher but
more fragmented, and after 1997 it was lower but more polarized. It is true
to say that if the opposition group on the Lamer Court had a leading voice,
that voice probably belonged to La Forest,45 thus his departure clearly had
some impact on disagreement levels, although it is complicated by the fact
that the opposition voices were less united in the first seven years of the
Lamer Court than they had been for decades.
45 See ibid.
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Table 7: The Impact of the Charter on Disagreement Levels and Types
The Lamer Court 1991-99
CHARTER PUBLIC CRIMINAL PRIVATE TOTAL
ALL CASES 228 217 352 164 961
NON-UNANIMOUS DECISIONS 127 94 117 62 400
THREE OR MORE OPINIONS 77 26 35 23 161
PLURALITY DECISIONS 35 12 13 10 70
Table 7 suggests that Charter cases did not drive disagreement
levels on the Lamer Court to quite the same extent that they did on the
Dickson Court, but they still provide more than their share of judicial
discord. A Charter case was one and a half times as likely as a non-Charter
case to result in a non-unanimous decision, and a non-unanimous Charter
decision was twice as likely to result in multiple opinions. However, this
mild convergence in disagreement rates was explained less by any
significant drop in Charter case disagreement (61 per cent of Lamer Court
Charter cases were not unanimous, compared with 66 per cent of Dickson
Court Charter cases) than by a rise in the levels of disagreement generated
by the other elements of the caseload: 37 per cent of Lamer Court non-
Charter cases were not unanimous, compared with 27 per cent for the
Dickson Court.
E. The McLachlin Court
Only tentative comments can be made about disagreement patterns
on the McLachlin Court. For one thing, the Court has only completed the
third full year of a Chief Justiceship that could last until 2018; for another,
it gained a new member in mid-2002 (with the retirement of Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6) and a second new member in the beginning of the 2003-
04 term when Justice Gonthier reached retirement age. The stability of
membership and the concomitant rise in the years of experience of the
average member of the Court that existed under Lamer have been
exchanged for a string of new appointments and, consequently, a relatively
junior Court that will take some time to work out its alliances and
partnerships. What can be said of the first two years is what one would
expect: namely, that the patterns of the late Lamer years have continued
into the early McLachlin years, both in the sense of a low and declining
overall level of disagreement, and an increasing polarization (rather than
fragmentation) of the disagreement that remains; this generalization begins
to wear thin by the third year.
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There is no clear centre to the way that disagreements have
emerged on the Court. Justices Bastarache and L'Heureux-Dub6 have
written and signed the most minority opinions, with 37 and 31 respectively;
most of the other members of the Court are clustered between McLachlin's
18, and LeBel and Gonthier's 24; lacobucci stands out with a low of 14. But
another measure points to a slightly different direction: L'Heureux-Dub6,
Bastarache, and LeBel have written the most minority opinions, with 19,18,
and 18 respectively, and Justice Arbour trails only slightly with 14; the
others are clustered tightly between Major's 5 and Binnie's 10. This
represents what we might call a marvelous democratization of
disagreement, with everyone taking a turn and no one taking too many, but
it would be even more remarkable if this pattern continued to prevail
through the decade.
Table 8: Types of Non-Unanimous Decisions
The McLachlin Court 2000-02
2000 2001 2002 ALL
SERIATIM 0 0 0 0
FRAGMENT 0 1 2 3
TIEBREAKER 2 1 2 5
SWARM 1 0 1 2
OUTLIER 5 7 6 18
TRANSITION 0 0 1 1
COMPACT 7 6 10 23
POLARIZED 11 8 9 28
TOTAL 26 23 31 80
The distinctiveness of Charter cases continues to erode: they are
now only 1.4 times as likely as any other case to result in a non-unanimous
decision, and a non-unanimous Charter decision is only 1.25 times as likely
to result in multiple opinions. One logical scenario that might have applied
to the unified post-Laskin Court's collision with the demands of the
Charter-that there would be strong disagreement over the Charter, but
continued solidarity on other matters-turns out definitely not to be the
case. Instead, the Charter opened divisions on the Court that rather quickly
spread to other matters, and now that things are subsiding after a
tumultuous decade, disagreement rates are declining on a parallel track in
all major areas of law.
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VII. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
All of these statistics provide little more than sequential
description; the real question is what generalizations, what conclusions,
even what predictions, can be generated from this description. What does
or does not contribute to changing levels of disagreement? And what in
turn does this tell us about the nature and the possible future of the
Supreme Court of Canada?
At an abstract level, the concept of the "disagreement fan" and the
Court's actual performance can be reduced to three dimensions, each of
which can be expressed as a number. The first is the question of the
proportion of caseload that generates non-unanimous decisions over any
time period; that is, the "extent" of disagreement. Over the past thirty
years, this proportion has fluctuated between a low of 13.3 per cent in 1980
and a high of 53.3 per cent a decade later, averaging 34.8 per cent or just
over one case in every three. This is shown in Table 9. Because the string
of numbers can be numbing, the figure for each year is accompanied by a
descriptor-"medium" if the figure is between 80 per cent and 120 per cent
of the thirty-year average, "low" if it falls below this band, and "high" if it
is above. This simply repeats the data from Figure 1 in a slightly different
form and recreates both the "Laskin valley" and the "Lamer mountain."
The second dimension is the question of how often this
disagreement takes the form of something other than a dichotomous
split-how often there is a second, third, or fourth minority opinion that
fragments the concern expressed about the majority or plurality outcome
and reasons. The second column therefore counts the extra minority
opinions, expressing this as a fraction of the non-unanimous cases, which
is labelled the "spread" of disagreement. If every non-unanimous decision
in any year were dichotomous, this figure would be zero. Again, each year
is described as "medium" (80 per cent to 120 per cent of the average
figure), "low" (below 80 per cent), or "high" (above 120 per cent). The
lowest value for this is 0.11, which means that very few of the non-
unanimous decisions generated anything other than a dichotomous result;
the highest value is 1.06 in 1994, which means that just over half of the
minority reasons generated during the year took the form of a judge
disagreeing not only with the decision but also with at least one other
disagreeing judge. Over the decade, this averaged 0.44, meaning that we
have half as many minority opinions as non-unanimous cases. The higher
this number, the more fragmented the Court's disagreement.
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Table 9: Dimensions of Judicial Disagreement
on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1974-2002
Extent Spread Depth Turnover
Year (Percentage of (Extra minority (Extra signatures (Judges with
non-unanimous opinions or non- or minority more than 3
decisions) unanimous) opinion) years service)
1974 43.8% high 0.51 medium 1.06 high 3 high
1975 46.0% high 0.35 medium 1.06 high 3 high
1976 34.5% medium 0.21 low 1.32 high 2 medium
1977 30.8% medium 0.22 low 1.72 high 0 low
1978 34.5% medium 0.25 low 1.40 high 2 medium
1979 20.2% low 0.25 low 0.83 medium 3 high
1980 13.3% low 0.13 low 0.94 medium 3 high
1981 15.2% low 0.21 low 1.18 high 3 high
1982 17.9% low 0.27 low 0.95 medium 2 medium
1983 38.9% medium 0.11 low 0.97 medium 1 low
1984 23.9% low 0.45 medium 1.09 high I low
1985 30.9% medium 0.60 high 0.75 medium 2 medium
1986 36.3% medium 0.76 high 0.31 low 2 medium
1987 23.0% low 0.42 medium 0.78 medium 2 medium
1988 37.8% medium 0.48 medium 0.49 low 2 medium
1989 43.5% high 0.85 high 0.66 low 5 high
1990 53.3% high 0.72 high 0.50 low 5 high
1991 31.6% medium 0.75 high 0.46 low 5 high
1992 42.0% high 0.69 high 0.40 low 2 medium
1993 44.8% high 0.68 high 0.78 medium 2 medium
1994 50.0% high 1.06 high 0.57 low 1 low
1995 47.2% high 0.55 high 0.59 low 1 low
1996 40.2% medium 0.51 high 0.75 medium 0 low
1997 28.9% medium 0.46 high 0.74 medium 1 low
1998 50.0% high 0.26 low 1.07 high 2 medium
1999 30.0% medium 0.38 medium 0.90 medium 3 high
2000 35.4% medium 0.07 low 1.03 medium 4 high
2001 30.8% medium 0.29 low 1.16 high 2 medium
2002 40.0% medium 0.21 low 1.07 high 2 medium
Average 34.8% 0.44 0.87 2
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The third dimension is the question of how many judges join in the
disagreement without writing their own reasons-they sign on to a dissent
or a separate concurrence written by a colleague.46 Instead of a single judge
expressing concerns, these extra judges give us a pair, a trio, or sometimes
a quartet just one vote short of becoming the majority opinion. This
"depth" of disagreement is shown in the third column of Table 9,
expressing the number of extra judges as a fraction of the total number of
minority opinions. In this case as well, each year has been labelled as low,
medium, or high indicating whether it falls below, within, or above the 80
to 120 per cent band. Over the decade this averaged 0.87, meaning that
judges are almost equally likely to register disagreement by writing their
own reasons or by signing on to someone else's. But the oscillation is
significant, between a high of 1.72 in 1977 (a disagreeing judge is twice as
likely to sign as to write) and a low of 0.31 in 1986 (a disagreeing judge is
three times as likely to write as to sign). The higher this number, the more
compact and concentrated the Court's disagreement and the more it
identifies coherent groups organized around alternative views. This seems
to be the more significant type of disagreement, both theoretically and
practically, explaining why studies of appeal court behaviour often try to
identify the blocs of judges that tend to stick together on certain types of
issues.
There is no correlation between the first column and the other two
in Table 9, and no reason why there should be. If most of the court's
decisions are unanimous, we would still ask whether the disagreement that
shows itself in written reasons takes a dichotomous or fragmented form. If
most of the Court's decisions were non-unanimous, we would need to know
whether this disagreement was clustered or scattered. But there is a
relationship between the other two: the spread of disagreement and the
depth of disagreement play off against each other, with high values for one
tending to correspond to low values for the other. And the cycles through
which these two pass tell a somewhat different story from the rise and fall
of the extent measure. The simple story identifies the "Laskin valley" and
the "Lamer mountain" separated by the Chief Justiceships of Dickson and
McLachlin. But the more complex story reveals an evolution from the
Laskin Court, where disagreement was generally dichotomous and deep,
through the Dickson and Lamer Courts, where disagreement was
fragmented and shallow, and back into the McLachlin Court where it is
dichotomous and deep again. And this is a much more interesting story.
46 Presumably, this signature is often not casually bestowed but rather follows an exchange of
views that may have altered the text of the minority reasons, sometimes significantly.
2004]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
As described below, the major concern in the U.S. literature on
judicial disagreement is the breakdown in the tradition of U.S. Supreme
Court consensus that occurred around 1940. However, a secondary theme
running through the literature focuses on the form of judicial disagreement
in the 1950s and the influence of one specific judge. The American
literature today speaks of a generalized practice in which the non-majority
judges decide which of them will write the minority judgment, a process
that is customarily led by the senior judge and emulates the process by
which the majority group designates its own writer.47 This general
description must be modified for the more recent Rehnquist Court, but
mostly because of a contentiousness within the dominant right-of-center
group that leads to complex judgments and more special concurrences.48
But this was not always the practice in the United States, not even
after disagreement levels (the "extent" dimension) rose sharply after 1940.
The practice had a distinct and identifiable historical genesis and leader.
Beverly Blair Cook credits U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan
with having established a convention that the minority should try to write
a united opinion, and that the senior judge in the minority should assume
a responsibility similar to that of the Chief Justice in the majority to make
the writing assignment and to steer the compromises that keep the group
together. 49 The most striking thing about the Supreme Court of Canada's
disagreement behaviour, then, is that there has not yet been a Canadian
Brennan, and there is no comparable Canadian tradition of organizing the
dissent, although it started to lean that way under Laskin, and again has
started under McLachlin.
One consequence of this may well be that contingent circumstances
matter more in the disagreement performance of the Supreme Court of
Canada. The level and the organization of disagreement will fluctuate
more, and will depend more on shifts in personnel or caseload. This seems
a banal conclusion-how could changes in Court context and caseload not
impact the extent and the expression of disagreement-but in fact it is not
banal at all, as evidenced by the performance of the most obvious
comparator, the U.S. Supreme Court.
47 There is usually an ebb and flow between these two "camps" that can reach surprising levels,
but this is a different point. See e.g. Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, "The Norm of
Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court" (2001) 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 362.
48 See Jeffrey Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and theAttitudinal Model (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 282 ("[i]s there something about judicial conservatives that
causes them to haggle about the details of opinions that support conservatively decided outcomes?")
49 Beverly Blair Cook, "Justice Brennan and the Institutionalization of Dissent Assignment"
(1995) 79 Judicature 17. See also Wood & Gansle, supra note 39.
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From the era of the Marshall Court until about 1940, the U.S.
Supreme Court was highly consensual, with large majorities and low levels
of disagreement. This changed suddenly around 1940; since then, it has
been characterized by frequent disagreement, sharply divided courts, and
small majorities. American literature has focused on explaining and
assessing the consequences of this unique shift." But notice one
phenomenon that needs to be explained: there have been two extended
periods, one lasting more than a dozen decades and the second about half
as long, during which the levels and the intensity of judicial disagreement
changed very little even though the personnel and the caseload of the U.S.
Supreme Court significantly changed. The graph of this performance looks
like a side view of the sea bottom at the continental shelf. Aside from a
singular and extremely brief period, which coincides with neither of the
U.S. Supreme Court's most dramatic recent periods," circumstances such
as personnel and caseload do not seem to impact disagreement. This was
the expectation that I brought to the exploration of the Supreme Court of
Canada, looking for a pattern of disagreement that was institutionally
entrenched rather than fluctuating.
But the Canadian experience has been completely different, even
within a much shorter time frame than either the U.S. Supreme Court's
recent "high disagreement" phase or its earlier "low disagreement" phase.
Bora Laskin briefly generated on the Court a unanimity level of which U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall would have been proud, but
from this starting point disagreement levels rose steadily for more than a
dozen years to peak in the mid-1990s, and since then they have drifted
lower (but nowhere near as low as the late Laskin Court). The Americans
have a single episode to explain in two centuries of judicial
performance-the jump in disagreement levels in the early 1940s.
Canadians have three such stark changes in thirty years-the drop in
disagreement under Laskin, the fifteen-year rise under Dickson and Lamer,
and the modest but steady decline at the end of the Lamer years that has
continued under McLachlin.
50 See e.g. Stephen C. Halpern & Kenneth N. Vines, "Institutional Disunity, the Judges' Bill and
the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court" (1977) 30 W. Pol. Q. 471; Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein &
William J. Dixon, "On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme
Court" (1988) 50 J. Pol. 361; Stacia L. Haynie, "Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme
Court" (1992) 54 J. Pol. 1158; Robert H. Dorff & Saul Brenner, "Conformity Voting on the United
States Supreme Court" (1992) 54 J. Pol. 762; Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, "Of Time
and Consensual Norms in the Supreme Court" (1998) 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 874; David M. O'Brien,
"Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering the Rise of Individual
Opinions" in Clayton & Gillman, supra note 29 at 91.
51 That is, the New Deal confrontation with Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Warren Court.
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As I have already suggested, one major explanatory element is fairly
obvious: if circumstances matter in general, then the Charter matters in
particular. It is the Charter case law that has tended to fragment the
modern Supreme Court of Canada. In the two decades of the Charter era,
Charter cases have been twice as likely to generate disagreement as non-
Charter cases, and the extent of that disagreement (measured by the
number of minority opinions and number of signatures) has been greater
for these cases as well. Charter cases have made up about one-sixth of the
caseload, but account for more than one-third of the dissenting and
concurring behaviour. Absent the Charter, disagreement levels would have
shown only a very slow and modest upward drift since the late 1970s, and
instead of wondering why disagreement on the Court is sometimes so high,
we would be comparing our harmonious Court with its much more
acrimonious American counterpart.
But over a longer time span, the U.S. Supreme Court has bickered
and argued its way into, through and beyond the Warren Court, an epochal
period that literally "created the image of the Supreme Court as a
revolutionary body, a powerful force for social change. 52 Unlike the
Supreme Court of Canada, the U.S Court has done so in an institutional
way because it generates a remarkably consistent level of disagreement as
part of its normal way of doing business. Changes in personnel and
caseload are simply episodes within this consistent story. However,
disagreement on the Supreme Court of Canada is less institutional and
more episodic because there is no particular way of doing business that
incorporates a consistent level of dissent and argument. Indeed, there are
not even "two ways of doing business" (that is, one for the Charter and one
for other cases), because although the spread between the disagreement
levels for the two caseload categories remains reasonably constant, both
follow the same pattern of a fifteen-year drift upward, followed by a five-
year drift downward.
Each Chief Justiceship is different and each carries a different
capsule description: the precipitous drop in minority opinions once Laskin
gained effective control of his Court; the modestly more relaxed leadership
of the Dickson Court that saw disagreement levels rise slightly but steadily;
the spectacularly fragmented Lamer Court, with its much higher levels of
disagreement, especially toward the middle of the 1990s; and the declining
levels of more compact disagreement of the McLachlin Court. Bringing in
the other dimensions of judicial disagreement make the differences even
more stark: from this angle, the Court has moved through a period of
52 Lucas A. Powe, The Warren CourtandAmerican Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2000) at 1.
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compact dichotomous disagreement under Laskin, through a period of
fragmented disagreement under Dickson and Lamer, and back to compact
dichotomous disagreement under McLachlin. But four different patterns
under four different Chief Justices is the very antithesis of generalization
(other than the generalization that the Chief Justice makes a difference).
Table 10: Dimensions of Disagreement by Chief Justiceship, 1973-2003
CHIEF JUSTICE EXTENT SPREAD DEPTH
LASKIN 53  LOW LOW HIGH
DICKSON MODERATE HIGH LOW
LAMER HIGH HIGH LOW
MCLACHLIN MODERATE LOW HIGH
It is a little difficult to understand how a Chief Justice can make
such a difference. The standard phrase (which obscures as much as it
informs) describes the office as "the first among equals," but there would
have to be a heavy stress on "equals" because a Chief Justice has very little
power over the associate justices. Perhaps it is a question of a forceful
personality in the centre chair to whom the others defer; perhaps it is a
successful attempt to persuade the members of the Court to a certain style
or tone of disagreement; or perhaps it is leadership by example. This latter
element can, of course, point in either direction. The fact that both Dickson
and McLachlin wrote or signed minority opinions less often after they
became Chief Justice suggests a moderating influence on their colleagues,
but Lamer's willingness to write minority opinions even after assuming the
centre chair suggests the opposite.
One curious finding is that turnover has no systematic or
predictable impact on disagreement, which is rather surprising because
there are several reasons for thinking that it would. First, on an individual
level, it has been demonstrated that seniority correlates with disagreement
frequency;54 since turnover replaces senior judges with junior judges, this
in itself should have an impact. Second, there is bound to be an acclimation
or transition period (one could argue about the length) for newly appointed
Limiting this to what I have called the "real" Laskin Court after 1978.
54 Peter McCormick, "Career Patterns and the Delivery of Reasons for Judgment in the Supreme
Court of Canada, 1949-1993" (1994) 5 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 499.
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justices, moderated, but by no means eliminated by the fact that they are
seasoned mature professionals, usually with judicial experience on appeal
courts. Third, the last decade of Canadian experience makes the argument
superficially plausible: high turnover in the five years centered on 1990
correspond to the relatively harmonious years of the Lamer Court; and the
five "natural court" years centered on 1995 correspond to the peak
disagreement years; the five years centered on 2000 has seen both turnover
and lower rates of disagreement.
The measure of turnover that I will use is the simple one: as of
October 1 of each year,55 how many judges have less than three years of
service on the Court? The three years is arbitrary but convenient. In terms
of the literature, it is a little on the long side-Elliot Slotnick thought that
it was just the first year that one should single out,56 while Lenore Alpert,
Burton Atkins, and Robert Ziller prefer to identify a two-year period.57 My
reasons are practical: excluding the current incumbents, the average Court
judge appointed since 1949 has served just under thirteen years (12.87)
before leaving the Court, meaning that over the last fifty years we have seen
an appointment to the Court roughly once every year and a half. This in
turn generates convenient dividing points for the categories: two judges
appointed in the previous three years is "medium turnover," anything lower
is "low turnover," and anything higher is "high turnover." The pattern is
shown in the fourth column of Table 9. It is clear at a glance that there is
no connection between the rate of turnover and disagreement behaviour
in any of its three dimensions: we cannot even say that high turnover courts
give us junior judges more ready to sign than to write and that low turnover
courts give us senior judges who are more ready to write than to sign. The
lack of any correlation precludes the otherwise attractive option of
assuming that the McLachlin Court will emulate the Lamer Court in the
sense that the extent and the spread of disagreement will go up once the
string of recent appointees settles in.
It is also clear that a particular kind of turnover, namely that which
occurs after an election puts a new party and a new prime minister in
power, does not matter either. In the American experience, of course, it
does. One of the best predictors of the voting patterns on the U.S. Supreme
Court is the question of which president belonging to which political party
55
Not September 1, because September is the most popular month for Court appointments (six
since 1949), and these usually involve a vacancy on September 1, which is filled later in the month.
56 Elliot E. Slotnick, "On Conventional Wisdoms, Context and Judicial Career Patterns: A
Response to Professor Rathjen" (1980) 42 J. Pol. 1173.
57 Lenore Alpert, Burton M. Atkins & Robert C. Ziller, "Becoming a Judge: The Transition from
Advocate to Arbiter" (1979) 62 Judicature 324.
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made the appointment. (The Republicans have had a few more misfires
than the Democrats, so the correlation is not perfect, but it is still very
strong.) The Canadian Court provides a solid testing ground for the parallel
hypothesis, as it has gone from a strong Trudeau-appointed majority in the
late 1970s, to an all-but-one Mulroney court in the 1990s, and finally to a
majority of Chr6tien appointees. We can therefore identify three transition
periods as the Court balance swung from one prime minister's appointees
to another's: the mid 1970s (as the new Trudeau judges take over); the late
1980s (when the three appointments in early 1989 turned the Mulroney
judges from a 3-6 minority to a 6-3 majority); and the turn of the century
(when LeBel's appointment gave the Chr~tien judges a 4-5 minority that
became a 5-4 majority thirty months later). We can also identify two
periods when appointees of a single party (indeed, a single prime minister)
totally dominated the Court. Do these transition points give us more
disagreement or possibly deeper disagreement as the two partisan blocks
confront each other? And, conversely, do the one-party dominant periods
between the transitions give us less disagreement or possibly more spread
disagreement as contingent differences within the single party block
become the main drivers of disagreement?
The answer to both questions is "no." At first, the proposition looks
quite promising. The 1970s gave us "The Great Laskin-Martland War" with
the Diefenbaker trio versus the L-S-D connection and the Quebec judges
holding the swing votes, and the disagreement levels dropped as attrition
thinned the ranks of the pre-Trudeau judges. But the years dominated by
the Trudeau judges are years of rising disagreement; the transition period
around 1990, like the one that follows a decade later, provides the quiet
part of the Lamer period, just as the "one-party dominant" period in the
centre of the decade is the one that sees the highest levels of disagreement.
It is therefore wrong to suggest that the experience of the last thirty years
allows us to predict rising disagreement levels on the Court as the Chr6tien
appointees confront the Mulroneyjudges, followed by falling disagreement
when the Liberals have finished rebuilding the Court.
Why, then, is there a difference between Canada and the United
States? There is a major ideological division in American society that
translates itself through the party system to create a certain pattern of
disagreement within the U.S. Supreme Court on cases triggering critical
issues, a pattern characterized by partisan polarization that takes a
predictable form around certain central issues. But this generalization does
not cross the 49th parallel-it does not matter whether we see the major
reason for this non-parallelism as the absence of the ideological split, of its
expression through competitive political parties, or of its transmission
through the personnel of the Court into the decision patterns of the Court.
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This may also explain why there has been no Canadian Brennan to lead the
process of disciplining and organizing disagreement around this division,
making the Canadian pattern more the product of idiosyncratic
contingencies than the expression of deeper structural factors.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Courts tell us a great deal when they disagree. My project has been
to create a conceptual framework within which to locate these special
public pronouncements about the law. The common law, after all, is often
compared to a great conversation;58 the challenge is to work out what we
should make of the parts of the conversation within the Court that we can
overhear (and are intended to overhear) in the form of minority opinions.
Simply noting how often there is some disagreement on the panel, and
whether it is fragmented or concentrated, is the barest starting point for
this deeper understanding. We need to know far more about the styles and
the conventions of disagreement, about the way that the Court at certain
periods on certain issues has organized itself around that disagreement, and
about how (and how often) minority opinions have had an impact on the
future development of the law. The conceptual framework described in this
article is a first step toward exploring one corner of this important, but
mysterious, territory.
58 See e.g. H. Patrick Glenn, "The Common Law in Canada" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 261.
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